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GOVERNANCE IN DUTCH PENSION FUNDS 
 
Lei Delsen1 
 
1. Introduction 
Solidarity and equality are very important issues within the Dutch culture, which is 
individualistic and consensus and consultation-oriented (Delsen, 2002). The Dutch also tend 
to avoid risk. The Netherlands is a corporatist economy; it is typical for the social partners to 
be involved in the preparation, formulation and implementation of the national social-
economic policy. This is also reflected in pension funds’ governance. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the legal frame, including the 
most important changes introduced by the 2007 Pension Act. In Section 3 the developments 
in the size and characteristics of the Dutch pension market over the past decades are 
presented. The developments in the number and types of pension funds are addressed in 
Section 4. Section 5 deals with the ambition level of the occupational pensions and Section 6 
with the costs of the occupational pension schemes. Section 7 deals with the coverage of 
occupational pension funds. Sections 8 and 9 review the recent reforms of pension plans and 
related to this the redistribution of risks. The governance structure and supervision of pension 
funds are addressed in Sections 10 and 11. Section 12 concludes with the macro-economic 
impact of pension funds. 
 
2. Legal frame 
In the Netherlands, the second pension pillar involves the supplementary occupational 
pension system and is strongly linked to the idea of deferred wages. The establishment and 
control of pension funds is the responsibility of the social partners. Company pension funds 
and industry-wide pension funds may be managed by insurance companies. However, 
although the social partners may use fund managers to execute pension funds, the social 
partners within the board of the pension fund remain responsible for the assets and liabilities 
of the fund. 
The government provides the legal framework and fiscal support. On January 1, 2007, 
the Pension Act (Pensioenwet) replaced the Pension and Savings Funds Act (Pensioen- en 
Spaarfondsenwet – PSW). It constitutes the new legal framework in which the Dutch social 
partners reach pension agreements. The purpose of the Pension Act is to secure the pension 
amounts. It prescribes financing through full funding for the liabilities of pension funds. 
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Pension funds are responsible for business practice and risk management. It is also 
compulsory to separate the pension amounts from the company capital and to place the 
pension obligation outside of the company. Pension liabilities are financed by premiums paid 
and returns on investments. In the new Pension Act employers and pensioners are given more 
security about the (future) payment of their pension. Pension funds have to meet stricter 
demands concerning their equity, so that pensioners’ acquired rights can be honoured. 
Pensioners have the legal right to reliable and clear information about their pensions. A key 
aim is to increase transparency and to raise “pension awareness” to increase support for 
maintenance of the current pension system. On appointment the employer has to inform the 
newly hired employee within three months about all working conditions, including how his 
pension scheme looks and what he/she may expect after retirement, including accrual of rights 
and risks involved. At least once a year the active members have to be informed by the 
pension fund about their pension accrual and the indexation of their pension. Sleepers once in 
every five years have to be informed about indexation policy. The participant receives the 
right information in case the employer fails to pay the pension premium that affects the 
pension rights. Pension funds deal with the administration, contribution policy and investment 
policy and from January 1, 2007 also have the responsibility for formulating and realising the 
indexation ambition. 
 The 2007 Pensions Act also works to guarantee the financial viability of occupational 
pensions. It introduced a new Financial Assessment Framework (Financieel Toetsingskader, 
FTK) drafted by the former Pension and Insurance Supervisory authority (Pensioen- en 
Verzekeringskamer, PVK), which comprises several elements, including the marked-to- 
market value of liabilities and solvency requirements. There are also requirements regarding 
pension funds risk. For example, if a pension plan opts for increased investment risk, more 
financial reserves will have to be held to back the funding risk. The Guidelines for Pension 
Fund Governance drawn up by the social partners in the Foundation of Labour (2005) on 
request from the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment are – as requested by the social 
partners - legally embedded in the new Pension Act, so as to compel all pension funds to 
adhere to the principles by January 1, 2008 and authorise the Dutch central bank (De 
Nederlandsche Bank, DNB) - the supervisory authority since 2004 - to enforce compliance. 
The 2007 Pension Act states that pension fund managers exclusively act to favour the 
stakeholders of the funds. The governing body shall ensure that the pension fund operates 
solely for the benefit of all its stakeholders. However, there may be conflicting interests 
between employers, employees and pensioners as well as between managers and participants 
in the funds. The principle of good pension governance also requires certain standards 
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concerning competences and professionalism of the management and control and 
accountability. 
 Solidarity is the basis of Dutch pension funds: pension rights are offered on the same 
conditions to all employees, irrespective of gender, age or state of health. This requires 
mandatory participation. The Netherlands have a pseudo-compulsory pension. The 
Compulsory Participation in an industry Pension Fund Act (Wet verplichte deelneming in een 
bedrijfstakpensioenfonds - Wet BPF)2 obliges the employer to allow an employee into the 
company's pension plan if the employee belongs to a group to which a negotiated pension 
plan applies. At the request of the representative social partners in the sector concerned, this 
act gives the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment the option to make participation in 
that sector’s pension scheme compulsory for all employees and all employers within that 
sector. It applies to large sectors and branches like the government sector, health care, the 
building and metal industries, but also to bakers, the butchers and agricultural workers. 
Transaction costs are low, notable for the smaller companies that do not need to hire external 
pension know-how. Compulsory participation provides for solidarity between employees as 
well as between companies. It discourages the use of pension provision as an element to 
compete within a trade or industry sector. 
 It has been alleged that this Dutch pseudo-compulsory pension may conflict with 
statements in the EC treaty concerning free competition and the prevention of creation of 
monopolies. In 1999 the European Court of Justice concluded that the supplementary pension 
schemes are of social and economic importance. To safeguard these arrangements agreed 
upon by the social partners the Court was of the opinion that the exception clauses of the 
European Treaty in respect of the right of free competition are applicable. Without mandatory 
participation it will result in adverse selection: better risks participants would turn away from 
the sector pension funds. On the other hand in case of compulsory participation the risk of 
moral hazard is real, and may also be accompanied by limited accountability and transparency 
(see Clark and Bennett, 2001). 
 The new Pension Act does not allow pension schemes to set admission age higher than 
21, to prevent discrimination of younger workers. At present pension funds covering over 
40% of the active participants apply a minimum age, often 25 years, before acquiring pension 
rights. No admission age applies to over half of the active participants.  
 Since 1994, there has been PSW legislation in the Netherlands entitling employees (legal 
right) to a value transfer of their accrued pension rights to another employer, which prevents 
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the pension loss from occurring for these “sleepers”. So portability of pension assets between 
companies on job transfer within the Netherlands is guaranteed. The transfer value equals the 
present value of the entitlements on the transfer date. However, transfer from a final-pay 
scheme to an average pay scheme may imply loss of entitlements. Financial losses may also 
occur due to differences in indexation, franchise, etc. As of 1992, following the PSW the 
pensions of early leavers (“sleepers”) have to be indexed at the same rate as the pensions of 
the retirees. However, damage sustained in the past will not be repaired. 
 Based on the old PSW Act, the employer has the choice of funding private scheme 
benefits by means of the establishment an enterprise pension fund, by joining a branch 
pension fund, by concluding an insurance agreement for his employees with an insurance 
company (a B-polis) or to allow the employees to conclude pension insurance agreements 
themselves with an insurance company (a C-polis). Now that there is a legal right to value 
transfer, under the 2007 Pension Act this is no longer possible for employees to act as policy 
holders.  
 
3. Value and characteristics of the Dutch pension market 
Measured in value of assets, the Dutch pension market is one of the largest in Europe and 
shows an increasing trend. In the second half of the 1990s the increase was particularly strong 
(see Figure 1). In 1970 the balance sheet total of Dutch pension funds was almost 28% of 
gross domestic product (GDP), in 1989 this was 74% and in 1995 it increased to 81%. 
Between 1997 and 2006 Dutch pension funds investments almost doubled from over € 350 
billion to € 692 billion. As a proportion of GDP its value rose to 116% in 1999, and at present 
assets of private pension insurance funds amount to over 127% of GDP. The strong growth of 
pension funds assets in the 1990s is related to the fact that more employees gained access to 
collective pension schemes, the maturation of pension funds and the shift from pay-as-you go 
early retirement schemes towards funded pre-retirement schemes. Also the surge of the stock 
market played a role (Van Ewijk, 2005). Figure 1 also clearly shows the impact of the 2001-
2002 financial crisis. This pension crisis has been the trigger for fundamental changes.  
Under funding guaranties are based on the ability of the pension funds always to yield 
an adequate return on financial assets. In the first half of the 1990s the average annual returns 
of Dutch pension funds was 7.3%; in the second half of the 1990s this was higher: 11.6%. 
After 1999 returns have dropped and turned negative in 2001 (-2.5%) and 2002 (-8.0%). In 
2003 the average return rate again was 10.1%, in 2004 9.5% and in 2005 average return was 
13.0%. 
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Source: DNB. 
 
Dutch pension funds traditionally invested mainly in low-risk government bonds, in fixed 
interest investment. The only firm investment restriction in the Pension Act is a 5% maximum 
on investing in shares of the sponsor although there is a possibility of raising this to 10% if 
sufficient reserves are present. The past decades Dutch pension funds significantly increased 
their holding of equities. Its proportion in assets increased from a low 4% in 1980 to 27% in 
1995 and 50% in 2005. In the same period the proportion of bonds increased also from 8% in 
1980 to 40% in 2005 (see Figure 2). In 2005 shares and bonds represented 90% of the 
investments; against 48% in 1994 and 12% in 1980. In the late 1990s many pension funds 
invested in shares. As a result of favourable returns, shares accounted for 50% of their 
investments in 1999. After 1999 this percentage dropped to 42 in 2002 because of decreasing 
share prices. The increase in securities was accompanied by a strong internationalisation of 
investment. At the end of 1985 6% was invested in foreign securities; at the end of 2004 this 
was nearly 73%. The investment in real estate dropped from 9% in 1980 to 4% of total 
investments in 2005. The expansion in share ownership has been mostly at the expense of 
private loans. Its share in total investments decreased from 80% in 1980 to 43% in 1994 to 
6% in 2005.  
 
Figure 1. Balance sheet total Dutch pension funds, 1970-2005, percentages of GDP 
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Source: DNB. 
 
Risk baring investments in shares may outperform bonds in the long run; they also make 
funds more vulnerable and dependent on stock exchanges. In 2001 and 2002 due to dropping 
share prices and negative returns, about 300 Dutch pension funds became underfunded. The 
average funding ratio declined from 150% in 1999 to 109% in 2002, to what it was in the 
mid-1990s.(see Figure 3). After 2002 the values of shares and solvency increased again; in 
2005 the funding ratio was 131. To restore funding ratios as required in the supervisory 
authority PVK 2002 letter in the public and private sector contributions were raised. 
Figure 2. Investment mix Dutch pension funds, 1980-2005, percentages  
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Source: DNB 
 
Figure 3 also shows that the new Pension Act has its impact on the funding ratio. The 
new measure of funding ratio based on the marked-to-market valuation reflects the steady 
decline of the long-term interest rates since the early 1990s. Note however, that it only relates 
to the guaranteed liabilities, i.e. the accrued benefit obligation, excluding the index ambition. 
Adjusting liabilities to inflation, funding rate mid 2006 was about 100% and some 90% in 
case pension benefits increase in line with wages (Kakes and Broeders, 2006: 50). Figure 3 
moreover shows that the erosion of the financial position of the pension funds began much 
earlier than by the measure based on the fixed actuarial rate of interest. 
 
4. Three types of pension funds 
Relative to other countries, the influence of trade unions on structuring the supplementary 
pension schemes is strong, because social partners commonly structure the second pension 
pillar not only at enterprise level, but also at branch level and national level. In 2006, in the 
Netherlands there were about 800 pension funds (see Table 1). Although no legal form is 
required, almost all Dutch pension funds are not-for-profit foundations. Three major types of 
pension funds can be distinguished: company funds, industry-wide funds, and professional 
group funds. They are closed pension funds: they support pension plans that are of certain 
(groups of) of employees. 
 Company funds provide pension plans to the employees of their sponsor company. They 
are separate legal entities, but are run directly by the sponsor company and, often, the union 
 
 
80% 
110% 
140% 
170% 
200% 
230% 
1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006q2 
Figure 3. Funding ratio Dutch pension funds, 1988-2006 
Marked-to-
market 
valuation 
4% actuarial 
interest rate 
  
8 
of the employees. Examples of company pension funds are Akzo Nobel, ABN AMRO, 
Heineken, KLM, Rabobank, Philips, Royal Dutch Shell, and Dutch railways. 
 
Table 1. Number of Dutch pension funds by type of funds, 1997-2006 
 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 
Industry-wide pension funds 
Company pension funds 
Professional pension funds 
Total 
103 
669 
20 
792 
103 
707 
21 
831 
104 
718 
19 
841 
103 
753 
17 
873 
102 
804 
18 
924 
100 
843 
18 
961 
92 
877 
17 
986 
93 
904 
17 
1,014 
85 
938 
17 
1,040 
82 
957 
20 
1,059 
Source: DNB. 
 
 Industry funds provide pension plans for employees in an industry. Such pension plans are 
based on a collective labour agreement (CLA) between an industry’s companies and the 
labour unions, representing the employees in this industry. There are two types of industry-
wide pension funds: compulsory funds and non-compulsory funds. Compulsory funds are 
based on a CLA making participation mandatory for all employers and employees working in 
the respective industry. ABP Pension Fund Foundation (government and educational sector) 
and PGGM (healthcare and social work sector) are well known examples. ABP and PGGM 
represent about 40% of Dutch pension funds’ assets and 35% of all participants (see Delsen, 
2008). Non-compulsory industry funds refer to CLAs that leave employers a choice as to 
whether or not to participate. 
 Finally, professional group funds offer pension schemes to specific professional groups 
(e.g. public notaries; doctors, physiotherapists, solicitors etc.). In contrast to company and 
industry funds, professional group funds deal directly with workers and not with employers. 
Other types of pension funds include saving funds, but they constitute a very small share of 
the industry. 
 The Dutch pension system is dominated by industry-wide pension funds in terms of assets 
as well as participants. In 2005 industry-wide funds accounted for two-thirds of private sector 
pension fund assets; company funds for about 30% and professional pension funds for about 
3%. The large majority of employees are covered by industry-wide pension funds. This 
applies to both active members (85% in 2005) and pensioners (79% in 2005). The total 
number of pension funds shows a decreasing trend. During the passed decade its number 
decreased from over one thousand to less than 800 (see Table 1). The number of company 
pension funds dropped from 957 to 669, while the number of industry-wide pension funds 
increased from 82 to 103. The number of professional funds is rather stable at about 20. This 
trend in numbers mirrors the increasing size of pension funds in terms of participation, 
coverage and assets that allows achieving considerable economies of scale in pension fund 
provision. 
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5. Ambition level 
Mandatory pensions in the Netherlands are high by international standards. First and second 
pillar pensions together aim at a level of 70% of final earnings for all income classes at the 
pension age of 62. At the – statutory – age of 65 pensions can grow up to 100% of the final 
earnings. From an international perspective, also the ambition level of the second pillar is 
relatively high; the share of the second pillar in pension income is 40%. When pension funds 
become more mature, it is expected to increase to 60% (Van Ewijk, 2005). The importance of 
occupational schemes reflects a strong corporatist tradition. According to this tradition, apart 
from the state providing a basic minimum pension, pension provision is primarily viewed as a 
collective responsibility of employees and employers. Pension schemes are an important part 
of the employment conditions laid down in (collective labour) agreements. Admission rules, 
provisions and benefits are determined in collective bargaining between the social partners, 
i.e. self-regulation within tight legal framework. The corporatist character is also reflected in 
the fact that pension funds are organised on the basis of industry or business sectors (Delsen, 
2008).  
Pension funds address the supplementary old age provisions on top of the basic public 
old age pension, the General Old Age Act (Algemene Ouderdomswet – AOW). Occupational 
pension schemes are supplementary to the AOW state pension. The AOW benefit is therefore 
a factor included in most calculations of second pillar pension schemes in order to arrive at 
the 70% of final earnings referred to above. Below this so-called AOW franchise, employees 
are covered by the public pension scheme. Only workers with a wage above this franchise are 
building up an occupational pension. In the past, many pension funds used a franchise that 
was derived from the level of the AOW (see Table 2). Since a considerable part of the pension 
liabilities in the second pillar are based on the last actual final pay, including the AOW 
franchise, a freeze or decrease of the AOW benefit imply that the supplementary occupational 
pension has to be increased: privatisation is creeping in. A hidden redistribution within and 
between generations is the result.  
 
Table 2. Selection of types of franchise (percentages of active participants), 1998-2006 
 Public old age 
pension (AOW) 
Fixed (indexed) 
amount 
No franchise Number of 
participants 
(1,000) 
1998 49.1 34.5 14.4 4,822 
1999 41.8 39.3 16.4 4,931 
2000 40.7 38.9 16.2 5,177 
2001 37.5 40.1 18.3 5,391 
2002 27.4 47.3 19.8 5,905 
2003 22.3 58.3 14.6 6,220 
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2004 22.1 60.7 12.4 6,052 
2005 23.6 58.9 15.1 6,246 
2006 23.3 55.8 15.7 6,217 
Source: DNB. 
 
More and more pension funds no longer directly link the franchise to the public AOW 
pension, but applied a fixed amount thereby shifting the political risk of lower public benefits 
to the workers (see Table 2). These changes are partly related to cost containment. In 1998 
49.1% of all active participants had a franchise linked to the public pension. In 2006 this had 
dropped to 23.3%. In the same period the proportion of active participants with the indexed 
fixed amount franchise increase from 34.5% to 55.8%. For around 16% of the active 
participants no franchise applies. In the pension funds that do not have a franchise all 
employees, including low-income groups, accrue supplementary pension rights. The accrual 
rate may vary between salary groups. 
 
6. Costs of occupational pension schemes 
According to statistical data of Statistics Netherlands (CBS), Dutch employers pay about 
three quarters of the total contributions to occupational pension schemes; one quarter is paid 
by employees. In the majority of cases premiums are levied on wage income above a certain 
franchise. 
 
 
 Source: DNB. 
 
In the Netherlands between 1980 and 2004 pension contributions increased from 7.6 billion 
euro to 30.3 billion euro. The increase was particularly strong after the year 2000 (see Figure 
Figure 4. Pension contributions in the Netherlands, 1980-2004  
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4). After 2000 also the amount of pension contributions collected by insurance companies has 
increased substantially. The development in the pension contribution rate is U-shaped. In 
percentages of the wage bill, pension contributions decreased from 10.6% in 1980 to 6.6% in 
1996 (pension holidays). In the early 1990s, as pension funds were allowed to discount their 
liabilities at a fixed rate of 4%, high interest rates provided them with ample reserves. Low 
pension premiums are in the interest of the employers (profits), employees (wages) and the 
management (policy room). Pensions were increasingly financed by returns on investments in 
stead of premiums by active members. Pension premiums were set below cost price level. 
Before the crash in 2000 this was no problem. High returns on equities paid for the price 
(inflation) indexation of pensioners and the increase of pension liabilities. In the 1990s, the 
drop of the capital market interest rate to an historical low level lead to a sharp increase in the 
fair value of pension fund liabilities. These developments caused a reduction of reserves. The 
erosion was even deepened by the occurring shift towards high-risk investments. 
After 1996 the contribution rate increased. In 2000 the pension contribution rate was 
7.6% and then rose to almost 15.6% of the wage sum in 2004. According to Statistics 
Netherlands between 2000 and 2004 the share of pension premiums payable by employers 
doubled from 4% to 8% of the labour costs. The pension contribution rate as well as the 
development in this rate vary between sectors of activity. The strongest increase was in 
mining, quarrying and extraction, from 3% to almost 13%; the lowest increase was in hotels 
and restaurants, from 3 to over 4% (CBS, 2006). In 2004 pension premiums varied from 4% 
for butchers to 29% in cardboard. 
 
Table 3. Pension contribution in the government and private sector, 2002-2007 (percentages 
of gross wage) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Firms 10.5 12.9 14.2 14.4 14.6 14.9 
Government 14.5 16.9 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 
Source: CPB. 
 
Table 3 shows that the increase of pension contribution as a percentage of gross wage in the 
private and public sector alike was relatively strong in the years immediately after the 
2001/2002 financial crisis. After 2002 the values of shares and solvency increased again. 
However, this has not end the Dutch pension crisis. To restore funding ratios in the private 
sector contributions increased from 10.5% in 2002 to 14.2% in 2004, and in the public sector 
from 14.5% to 18% of gross wages. Table 3 also indicates that in recent years the contribution 
rates have stabilised in the public sector at 18% and have shown only a modest increase in the 
private sector. A contribution freeze combined with uncertain indexation, conditional on the 
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financial results of the pension fund, may de facto imply a shift towards defined contribution 
(Delsen, 2008). Risks are shifted towards the active participants as well as the pensioners. 
 The administrative and investments costs of private pension funds are of great 
importance to both employees and employers, as they potentially erode the value of wealth 
accrued for retirement or, alternatively, increase the costs of retirement security. Empirical 
results indicate considerable lower costs and better results of pension funds relative to 
insurance companies. Operating costs are lowest for large compulsory industry-wide funds. 
Defined contribution plans are far from cost effective (see Delsen, 2008; Bikker and De Dreu, 
2006). The collective nature of implies that participants automatically contribute enough 
towards their old age financing while professional asset managers make sure that the 
contributions are well invested from a risk-return perspective. This ensures that every 
individual is provided with a reasonable pension benefit after retirement. Collective pension 
systems are cost efficient, as they exploit economies of scale, and enable inter and intra 
generational risk-sharing which is welfare-enhancing to risk-averse individuals (Kakes and 
Broeders, 2006: 32). The recorded increasing importance of insurance companies in pensions  
may be detrimental to the cost effectiveness of the Dutch occupational pensions system. 
 
7. Coverage of occupational pension schemes 
The adequacy of private pension arrangements depends on: the coverage, the type of pension, 
the vesting rules, the portability of accrued rights and the indexation. The Dutch pension 
scheme is both effective and cost efficient: large numbers of employees are quite 
inexpensively insured, at the same time (Delsen, 2008). In the Netherlands both the number of 
participants and the number of occupational pension recipients are among the highest in the 
EU. In the 1998-2006 period number of active members increased in absolute terms from 4.8 
million to 6.2 million employees (see Table 2). Over 90% of the Dutch employees participate 
in occupational pensions. A pension scheme is part of the employment conditions laid down 
in an agreement (which may be a collective labour agreement). Employees must in many 
cases take part or do automatically take part in a pension plan linked to the contract of 
employment in the context of a collective labour agreement. This “employment related 
mandatory participation” by employees is more important than the legal extension of branch-
level collective agreements between trade unions and employers' organisations to all industry 
members, that obliges employers to take part in industry-wide pension fund. 
 The Pension Act allows the employer to exclude certain groups of employees from the 
pension scheme, unless the collective labour agreement makes acceptance obligatory. An 
hours-of-work threshold is forbidden. A minimum wage barrier is allowed as a threshold. 
  
13 
Many part-time workers are still being excluded from pension plans, because they have 
flexible labour contracts. A vesting period may apply. Although there is no legal maximum 
vesting period for supplementary pension schemes, only very few pension funds apply one. 
Vesting periods are typically shorter than one year. As a result of the growing amount of 
flexible workers and increasing labour mobility, a general compulsory pension would be the 
logical next step. In 2001 certain categories of employees (6% of active participants) were 
excluded from pension schemes. Three quarters of them concerned fixed-term contract (4.5% 
of active participants). A justified reason could be a very short duration and participation 
would result in a high administrative burden (Directive 1999 based on ETUC, UNICE and 
CEEP frame work agreement).  
 The vast majority of employees are covered by pension funds without a waiting 
period. Of the total of more than 6 million members of pension schemes and insurers, 
approximately 7% have a supplementary pension scheme with a waiting period. The vast 
majority has a waiting period of one year or less, and this waiting period counts with 
retroactive effect towards pension accrual. 
In 2001 about 81% (84% in 1996) of the funds covering 45% (74% in 1996) of the 
active participants applied a minimum entry age. It offers the opportunity to exclude holiday 
workers. The Foundation of Labour is in favour of abolishing the minimum age limits. 
Between 1998 and 2001 the relative number of active participants for which no age barrier 
applies increased from 31% to 55%.  
 For most disabled individuals and early retirees private pension contributions 
continue: contribution free continuation of pension accrual. They continue to build up rights 
up to the age of 65. Unemployed individuals only partly build up pension rights. This fraction 
of the duration of wage related unemployment benefits varies considerably between sectors of 
activity: over 90% in agriculture and building; less than 15% in financial services and other 
services; ABP 50%; Industry and mining 44%. Continuation of pension accrual is most 
frequent in case of unpaid leave (87%), care leave (74%), and sabbatical leave (58%) (SER 
2002). The Foundation of Labour (STAR, 2001) requested the parties involved in 
supplementary pensions to consider offering option to continue pension accrual in the case of 
parental leave, care leave or sabbatical leave.  
 
8. From defined benefit towards defined contributions 
In the Netherlands most active members of the second pillar pension schemes are in plans of 
the defined benefit type. Unlike in the UK, in the Netherlands, over the passed decade there 
has not been a shift from defined benefits (DB) to defined contributions (DC). In 1998 over 
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99.2% of the active members were in defined benefit plans; in 2006 this still was 93.4% (see 
Table 4). The major change concerns a change within the defined benefits plans from defined 
benefit final salary to defined benefit average salary plans. Measured in number of 
participants the shift is stronger than measured in number of pension funds. In 1998 two thirds 
of the active members were covered by a final-pay plan. In 2006 this was only 10%. In 2006 
three quarters the active members were covered by an average pay system; in 1998 this was 
one quarter. 
 
Table 4. Type of pension plans, percentages of active members, 1998-2006 
 Final 
pay 
Average 
pay 
Mixed 
schemes 
Fixed 
amount 
Total DB 
plans 
DC 
plans 
Total 
(1,000) 
1998 66.5 25.0 6.0 1.7 99.2 0.5 4,822 
1999 59.6 31.2 6.2 1.6 98.6 0.2 4,931 
2000 58.7 30.6 6.2 1.4 96.9 0.2 5,177 
2001 56.1 32.2 6.5 1.3 96.1 1.8 5,391 
2002 54.3 31.6 6.8 1.1 93.9 2.4 5,905 
2003 49.3 35.4 8.6 0.9 94.2 2.3 6,220 
2004 12.0 72.6 8.6 1.0 94.2 2.3 6,052 
2005 10.6 74.1 8.1 0.9 93.7 3.1 6,246 
2006 10.1 76.0 7.1 0.9 93.4 3.6 6,217 
 Change 
1998-2006  -55.4  51.0  1.1  -0.8  -5.8  3.1  1,395 
Source: DNB. 
 
In a final-pay plan the risk of disappointing yields lies completely with the pension funds, not 
with the individual participant. The final-pay plan is not only an open ended system, but also 
leads to a subsidy, through the back service obligations, for the career maker whose salary 
shows a sharp increase towards the end of their career (“perverted solidarity”). This 
introduces a pay-as-you-go element in the supplementary pensions and makes the pension 
premium susceptible to demographic developments. 
 Employees whose salaries peak early in their career are better off with an average pay 
plan. With a standard average-pay plan, a fixed percentage of those yearly wages is 
accumulated per year. The total pension then consists of the total of these yearly accrued 
pension rights. In an average-pay plan with indexation, the accrued pension claims are 
increased annually with the inflation percentage for that year. This provides better protection 
against the risk of inflation. A third variant is that in the standard average-pay plan an 
increase takes place toward the level of a final-pay plan, provided the means to do this are 
available. The investment risk lies completely with the pension funds. In the average-pay 
plan, there is substantially less back service than in the final-pay plan. The average-pay plan 
also decreases the pay-as-you-go element in the supplementary pensions. 
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 The mixed pension plans concern a combination of DB and DC. For instance, DB up 
to a certain salary ceiling; beyond this ceiling a DC type plan, notably in company pension 
funds. 
The fixed-amounts system applies to less than 1% of the active participants (see Table 
4). In this system, the pension is preset to a certain amount, regardless of the pay earned. This 
system, therefore, is quite similar to ordinary life insurance. The fixed-amounts system is 
prevalent in sectors where short-term contracts are common, such as the hotel and catering 
industry. 
 Defined-contribution systems (about 3% in 2006) are still rare in the Netherlands, 
although its number increased considerably between 1998 and 2006. Future pensions depend 
on uncertain investment returns. Employees bare the full investment risk, work inability risk, 
longevity risk and risk of inflation. As DNB considers mixed schemes to be DB plans, the 
developments in DC plans are underreported. 
Measured by active membership, the switch from final pay to average pay has been 
more pronounced in industry-wide funds, relative to company pension funds. Here ABP and 
PGGM set the scene in 2004 (Delsen, 2008). Company pension funds on the other hand have 
switched more from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans. These are mainly 
located in the smallest company and branch pension funds and with the professional pension 
funds.  
 
9. Redistribution of risks 
There are fundamental differences in the objectives and structure of pension funds and 
insurers. The basis mission of insurers is to make profits, besides the continuity objective. 
Pension funds do not make profits for the shareholders. Profits stay within the funds to 
improve the benefits for the beneficiaries or decrease contributions of the members. There 
also is an essential difference in structure: Within industry-wide pension funds contributions 
are set on the basis of an average premium for the sector as a whole. Hence, all employees of 
the company or of the sector concerned pay the same percentage of the wage as pension 
contribution, irrespective of age, health and wage, and also pension accrual is the same 
percentage. Solidarity goes beyond the purely insurance technical basis: solidarity between 
active and retired workers (inflation risk), between younger people and the elderly (back 
service rights); between men and women; between healthy people and disabled people 
(obligation to accept); between higher and lower wage earners (the biometric risks). 
Defined benefits provide against financial risks. Moreover, the defined benefit type 
pension schemes allow intergenerational solidarity within capital funding. Compulsory 
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participation facilitates intergenerational risk-sharing in defined-benefit schemes. Recent 
calculations indeed show that in the Dutch supplementary pension system because of average 
premium there is considerable redistribution between generations from young to old 
participants and within generations, from people with a with a flat career to people with a 
steep career from men to women and from people with a low life expectancy to high life 
expectancy and from lower educated towards higher educated (Bonenkamp, 2007). Collective 
arrangements allow for intra- and intergenerational risk-sharing. Intragenerationally, in the 
Dutch case the individual longevity risk can be almost entirely diversified by pooling, i.e. 
pension risks are spread over a large number of persons. Also the inflation and investment 
risks can be shared on a broader scale and spread over a longer period of time (Kakes and 
Broeders, 2006). 
There are trade-offs between contribution levels, benefit security, contribution 
volatility and benefit level. Increasing the benefit security implies a reduction in investments 
risk leading to lower expected benefits or greater reliance on contributions (higher or more 
volatile) (Kakes and Broeders, 2006). The design of pension plans is important how risks are 
allocated among stakeholders. Full indexation final pay plans are accompanied by both higher 
risk of nominal underfunding and a high volatility of contribution rates. Fixed contribution 
rates are accompanied by high indexation risks. 
Pension funds can be considered a zero sum game, for at a specific moment in time the 
total value of all claims can never be larger than the total capital of the fund at that moment 
(Koedijk and Slager, 2006). Who bears the risks and who has the right to the surplus build up 
by the pension funds? Hence, pension plan redesign also implies value transfers between plan 
members and other stakeholders and risk reallocation. Pensioners considered themselves 
victims of contribution holidays in the 1990s. The largest trade union federation FNV opposes 
defined contribution schemes. FNV is in favour of – for solidarity reasons between 
generations - conditional indexation for active members, sleepers and pensioners equally 
dependent on returns. Also the maturation of pension funds may cause trouble. As pension 
funds exist for longer than 40 years, an increasing number of elderly have a full pension: an 
increasing pension liability relatively to the wage bill. This undermines the effectiveness to 
use the contribution rate as a steering instrument. The same applies to the ageing. As a result 
returns become more important, and premiums are less so a policy instrument. This forces to 
make premiums cost bearing relative to pension obligations. Windfall returns have to be 
reserved to compensate for future disappointments (FNV, 2003). Unions in the Netherlands 
had to strike a balance internally, between the interest of younger workers and the interest of 
older workers and pensioners. Moreover, in most cases union representatives in pension 
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boards are often closely involved in wage negotiations. According to Ponds and Van Riel 
(2007) this explains why unions were willing to spread risk more broadly between active 
members and pensioners. An exclusively reliance on contribution rates to absorb risks would 
run the risks of alienation of younger workers and put a heavy burden on wage negotiations, 
as employers would try to shift pension costs to workers. 
Indexation is not a right; the majority of funds (some 65%) only incorporate an 
intention to provide indexation. Most pension funds in the Netherlands aim at wage or price 
indexation. It is, however, not guaranteed but conditional on the financial position of the fund 
(coverage ratio). In recent years many pension funds have constructed more explicit 
indexation rules. Dutch pension funds introduced flexible indexation as a primary method to 
enhance solvency risk management. Conditional indexation of benefits allows passing on 
disappointing investment results or demographic risks in part to the pensioners themselves 
(Van Ewijk and Van de Ven 2003). In a final wage system only the already retired suffer from 
incomplete indexation (Van Ewijk, 2005). In an average salary scheme conditional indexation 
becomes more effective, for it applies to both active members as well as pensioners. Hence, it 
allows shifting part of the inflation and investment risks to the active fund members.  
The switch from final pay to contingently indexed average pay plans plus the level of 
certainty chosen is a partial shift towards DC schemes (Kakes and Broeders, 2006). Solvency-
contingent indexation implies that the Dutch average wage scheme can be considered hybrid 
DB-DC plan, keeping a midway position between a traditional DB plan with flexible 
contributions and well-defined indexed pensions and a DC plan with uncertainty as to the 
final pension result because of the uncertainty on the rate of return on investments.  
DB pension funds have to cope with rising costs, while the 2005 International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the 2007 Financial Assessment Framework (FTK) 
for pension funds rules mean that DB pension funds as a cost item weigh more heavily on the 
balance sheet of the sponsoring company. There are economic considerations to remove 
pension liabilities from the balance sheet. The market valuation element of the FTK makes 
funding levels volatile. In a DC system funding shortfalls are no longer the responsibility of 
the company, explaining why several enterprise pension funds recently switch from DB to 
DC. The switch to average pay DB schemes and the introduction of DC elements can be seen 
as a move to more hybrid systems in which investment risk is more equally shared between 
sponsor and the participants (Kakes, 2006). 
A number of enterprise pension funds have changed from DB plan into collective DC 
plan with fixed contributions but flexible benefits depending on the financial situation of the 
pension fund (Ponds and Van Riel, 2007). Collective DC concerns DC for sponsor, employer 
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pays fixed and hence predictable percentage of the wage bill and DB for participants. 
Employers and employees contribute a fixed percentage of wages to these plans. The 
percentage is designed to assure generally that the plans are well funded. Employers have no 
additional liability if the investments of the plans perform poorly, and receive no benefit if the 
investments perform well. The risks of unexpected investment losses and longer than 
anticipated life expectancies is entirely borne by the employees and retirees as a group. If a 
collective DC plan suffers investment losses and becomes underfunded, the plan’s governing 
body, which has representatives of employers, employees, and retirees, decides what 
adjustments should be made. The adjustments can be an increase in contributions by 
employees (but not employers) or elimination of cost-of-living adjustments, and, in extreme 
cases, reductions in the benefits earned in future years. If the plan becomes overfunded, the 
workers, rather than the employer, benefit.  
 
10. Governance structure within pension funds 
The political responsibility of the occupational pensions is with the minister of Social Affairs. 
The social partners are responsible for the contents of the schemes. The control of pension 
fund strategy rests with the directors. Based on the Pension Act members of the board of 
directors must be composed equally of employee and employer representatives. No suitability 
requirements of members are stated. 
 Since March 1990 based on the PSW Act pension funds are obliged to introduce a 
participants board with only advisory authority if this is requested by at least 5% of the 
participants (active or retired). Members are representatives of employees, sleepers and 
pensioners. The aim was to strengthen the position and of pensioners within pension funds. 
The PSW Act describes on what decisions of the management advice of the participants’ 
board is required. These legal advisory rights concern for instance changes in statutes, 
pensions, and liquidation. Research by Regioplan (2001) shows that when all plans are 
realised, in both enterprise and branch pension funds for around 90% of active members and 
pensioners some form of participation applies; participant board or management board 
representation. In most cases the authority is in line or goes beyond the PSW Act. 
 December 2002, the CSO central elderly organisation, and the social partners in the 
Foundation of Labour signed an agreement that elderly organisation were offered a seat in the 
management boards of pension funds. This only concerned enterprise pension funds. Recently 
the older people (pensioners) got a say in the pension funds (a right to vote) in the boards of 
the pension funds and co-decide on premiums and benefit levels. Also the position of the 
participant boards is strengthened. In case of merger, take-overs or liquidation of a pension 
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fund the board has the right to agreement that can be commanded at the Chamber of 
Enterprises (Ondernemingskamer). Before that, the funds were run by representatives of the 
social partners on a 50-50 basis based on the PSW Act. Trade unions that represent the 
employees were also considered to represent the interests of the pensioners. Now employees 
and pensioners are equally represented in the board of directors. They receive a maximum of 
half of the employee seats. The seats are proportionally represented: according to the ratio of 
employed/retired participants. The social partners keep their majority. 
 The 2007 Pension Act prescribes a participant board for all industry-wide pension funds in 
which pensioners and employees are equally represented. Enterprise pension funds can 
choose. The large enterprise funds with more than 10% old age pensioners are required to 
investigate the manner in which the old age pensioners want to be represented within the 
pension fund. Depending on the outcome of this investigation the pension fund must either set 
up a participation council or include old age pensioners on its management board. 
 Following the Guidelines for Pension Fund Governance drawn up by the social 
partners in the Foundation of Labour (2005) the new Pension Act also obliges the pension 
funds to establish two new bodies by January 1, 2008 at the latest: an Internal control 
committee and an Accountability body. The Internal control committee is comparable with 
the Supervisory Board of a private enterprise. Every pension fund must have a body that is 
responsible for the internal supervision of the performance of the (management of) the fund. 
The Act provides several options, for example a one tier board, an audit committee or a 
review committee. The body for internal supervision must include at least three independent 
experts. The findings of the internal control committee are included in the annual report and 
discussed by the Board and the Accountability Body. The Accountability Body, in which 
employees, pensioners and employers are, in principle, evenly presented, is comparable with 
the share-holders’ meeting of a private enterprise. The management of the pension fund is 
accountable to this body (and as such indirectly to all those concerned). The Accountability 
Body will issue a judgement on the actions of the board of the pension fund on the basis of 
the annual report, the annual accounts and the findings of the Internal Control Committee. 
Most pension funds management boards have delegated day-to-day decisions to an 
internal board of executive directors. The management board can delegate operational tasks to 
an external body. Currently pension fund board and management of the pension fund 
organisation are focusing on further professionalising asset management as their core 
competence or (partially) outsourcing of these activities to external asset managers, especially 
for international and foreign securities, participations and real estate. These institutions must 
be licensed by the Dutch Securities Board (Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer). The need for 
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further professionalism is demonstrated by a new role of pension beneficiaries that have not 
been represented directly in the pension fund's management. Many pension funds have 
contracted out the management of the pension funds to competitive fund managers.  
 
11. Supervision of pension funds 
Apart from internal and external actuaries and accountants, the pension funds are under the 
supervision of the private Insurance Chamber/Insurance Supervisory authority 
(Verzekeringskamer), on behalf of the government. In 1992 it was given autonomy as an 
administrative authority with its own budget. In 2001 the Insurance Chamber was renamed 
Pension and Insurance Supervisory authority (Pensioen- en Verzekeringskamer, PVK). In 
2004 the Dutch central bank and supervisory authority for banks (De Nederlandsche Bank, 
DNB) and the PVK merged. This consolidation is generally expected to enhance the quality 
of supervision on pensions and strengthen the supervisory authority. 
Pension funds are legally obliged to provide the supervisory authority on an annual 
basis with detailed information on benefit payments and investments of the funds. In the 
"Actuarial Principles for Pension Funds", which became effective at the end of 1997, PVK 
introduced a sufficiency test for the funding position based on assets valued at market rates 
and nominal liabilities discounted at a fixed rate of 4%. In addition PVK imposed a ceiling on 
the rate of returns on investments which funds can use, including 5% on bonds. In case assets 
fall short of liabilities PVK discusses actions to be taking with the pension fund. 
 In response to the financial crisis, the PVK tightened up the regulations for pension 
funds and intensified their supervision. PVK required full funding and additional reserves 
(buffers) to compensate the higher risk involved. September 2002, the PVK required that on 
average the pension fund should enough capital plus reserves to cover the liabilities for 130%; 
45% of the funds, including ABP and PGGM, had asset-liability coverage ratios of less than 
105% – the basic funding requirement. In addition there is an indexing buffer and an asset 
buffer. PVK gives the funds until 2010 to establish the norm. As most funds did not comply 
apart from selling shares to comply with the demanded buffer, contributions were raised, 
benefits were frozen, and pension schemes of the employed were sobered, including partial 
indexation, limiting the accrual rate, and a massive shift from final pay to average pay 
schemes. Increasing share prices may actually cause problems for the pension funds, for PVK 
will demand larger reserves. This forces certain pension funds to sell shares, to increase 
premiums further or to cut in pension claims. 
March 2004 Dutch Parliament approved the “Principles of the new Supervisory 
Framework of Pension Funds” that replaced the 2002 PVK rules and that are included in the 
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new 2007 Pension Act. These principles reflect a political consensus on the trade-off between 
certainty and security of pension provisions and economic costs. The Dutch government 
wanted to make the rules for pension funds less tight: employees running a risk is allowed. 
Also employers and employees were in favour. This was a major breakthrough, for until 
recently absolute security was the rule. But the latter is expensive; it requires large financial 
reserves by the pension funds to cover investment and other disappointments. Less certainty 
implies lower premiums for employers and employees. The risk exists that the pension benefit 
is lower than expected in case of disappointments. Following these 2004 principles, the actual 
value will be aligned to the definition of fair value for reporting purposes of the International 
Accounting Standard Board. Apart from assets and liabilities to be valued against market 
values, profits and losses in the pension fund portfolio should be activated on the profit and 
loss account immediately. The minimum capital requirement will depend on the institution's 
actual risk profile. Pension funds with higher (lower) exposure to stock market risks should 
aim for a corresponding higher (lower) solvency ratio. Fair value increases volatility in 
contributions and indexation, focuses more on the short-term nominal commitments, while 
pension funds aim at long term real ambitions, has a procyclical impact on the economy and 
accumulates prudence. 
 The 2007 Financial Assessment Framework (FTK) is based on a marked-to-market 
value of assets and liabilities and three tests to evaluate the ability of pension funds to meet 
their obligations and an obligation to pension funds to clearly inform scheme members of 
their policy on indexation. The financial buffer is the surplus i.e. the difference between the 
marked-to-market value of assets and that of its liabilities. The surplus serves various 
purposes: permits risk absorption without underfunding (risks being shifted to the future or 
pension entitlements must be cut); contributes to costs of living adjustment; pension benefits 
keep pace with inflation or wage growth (indexation); permits fairly stable development of 
pension contribution and avoids procyclical interaction between pension funds and overall 
economy.  
 Three interlinked test will be used to asses the solvency of the Dutch pension funds: 
- a minimum test requires the present value of the assets, based on marked-to-market 
calculations, to exceed the present value of the contracted liabilities by at least 5%, 
i.e. pension funds should always maintain a minimum funding ratio of at least 105%. 
If assets drop below 105% of liabilities, the fund has only one year to recover. In 
exceptional cases, the supervisor can prologue this recovery period. 
- a solvency test on the financial position, to verify whether the pension fund can pass 
the minimum test one year from now with a probability set at 97.5%; in order to limit 
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the risk of underfunding, this requires a 130% funding ratio. The tests only apply to 
guaranteed (in practice nominal) pension rights. For conditional rights (indexation), 
funds are not obliged to reserve extra capital, provided the conditional nature of the 
indexation is made clear to members so that they cannot gain the false impression that 
they are entitled to it. Moreover, in order to maintain consistency between the funds 
ambition, its communication and its policy, pension premiums should rise with the 
indexation ambition. 
- a new continuity test on long-term developments in solvency levels; the pension fund 
should indicate their expectations of the development of the funding ratio on a 15 year 
horizon. 
Due to the short-term solvency requirement and to the valuation of liabilities in a marked-to-
market basis, liabilities will become more volatile and the balance sheet of the funds will be 
more sensitive to the interest rate risk. For the actuarial fixed discount rate is replaced by the 
actual yield curve of interest rates prevailing in the market. Fair value accounting will lead to 
higher funding costs of pensions. Pension funds have two options: less risk taking or higher 
solvency reserve position. Adjusting the pension promise is also an option. The first impact, 
which is probably the most obvious, is that Dutch pension funds will need to invest more in 
long-dated fixed-income products to reduce the duration gap between assets and liabilities and 
to cool down the impact of interest rates changes on the cover ratio. Reducing the duration 
gap between assets and liabilities leads to a decrease in indexation cuts and average 
contribution. Investing in bonds may imply lower returns and higher pension contributions 
but also more certainty to their pension (Kakes and Broeders, 2006). 
Pension fund supervision by the DNB is focussed on continuity of pension 
entitlements. The focus is on the coverage that guarantees that the paying of the pensions and 
the realisation of the indexation ambition of the funds. There is a trade-off between indexation 
ambition and required coverage rate. The pension fund manager is between the participant 
board with only an advisory role and the far more professional supervisor, the DNB. Will the 
interest of the participants be presented well in this context? This very much depends on the 
financial and material incentives. Who should approve the salary policy, the participants or an 
accountability board? The latter is not addressed in the Pension Act. The room to play for the 
managers depends on avoiding conflicts with DNB. This may create an incentive to risk 
avoidance and shortermism in investment policy not to endanger the coverage rate (Koedijk 
and Slager, 2006). This may be at the expense of returns in the long run and hence of the 
possibility to realise the indexation ambition (Arnold, 2007). A conservative asset mix is not 
  
23 
attractive for younger workers as the low return on assets imply higher contributions (Ponds 
and Van Riel, 2007). Incentives and salary of managers deserves more attention. 
 
12. Macro-economic effects 
The Dutch pension funds contribute to the affluent availability of capital. Dutch pension funds 
also invest in hedge funds like Centaurus and the American Paulson & Co. In their role of 
indirect capitalists the Dutch employees finance through their pension funds the take over of 
their own enterprise and with that, maybe also the own job security. 
Labour mobility may be hampered when accrued pension rights are not fully 
transferable. There may be a trade-off between micro-prudential interests and macro-
economic interests. Notably in DB schemes pension fund behaviour is procyclical, adding to 
the business cycle situation. Procyclical effects can be limited by controlling pension risks 
(Kakes and Broeders, 2006). 
 
Table 5. Selective macro-economic performance measures in the Netherlands, average annual 
change, 1996-2005 
 1996–2000 2001–2005 
GDP (volume) 3.7 0.7 
Pension contribution (in percentage points of gross wage 
enterprises) 
0.1 1.7 
Unit labour costs 0.8 1.6 
Price competition 1.6 – 2.3 
Source: CPB. 
 
Table 5 shows that the change in pension contributions (in percentage points of gross wage in 
private sector) between 1996 and 2000 was 1 percentage point and between 2001-2005 1.7 
percentage point. The development in the invested capital by pension funds in combination 
with the pension premium policy contributed to the drop in private consumption and because 
of the unique funded pension system the impact on the business cycle on pension 
contributions was larger than in other countries; the recent recession was the longest after 
World War 2. Increases in contributions in particular have a negative effect on the economy, 
the effects of an indexation cut leads to more balanced distribution of the burden between 
active members and pensioners (Westerhout et al., 2004). 
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